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Abstract: 
The Darfur crisis in western Sudan started in February 2003. It has to 
date claimed the lives of an estimated number of 200,000 people and 
another 2.5 million have been displaced and are now living in make 
shift refugee camps in Chad and neighbouring countries. All attempts 
to broker peace among the major warring factions had proved 
abortive and there is little or no hope that the displaced people would 
one day return to their villages. The killings, raping, suffering and 
starvation had continued despite the presence of the African Union 
troops which numbered about 7000 and deployed since 2004. A lot of 
propaganda, misinformation, fabrications and distortions have gone 
across to the public in trying to explain the causes and attendant 
consequence of the said conflict. These have clearly stood on the way 
to a real understanding of the genesis of the crisis for a lasting peace 
to be obtained and peace building to be accelerated, and end this 
bloodshed and suffering that had been the bane of the region for the 
past five years. This paper is an appraisal of the various views and 
opinions that had been put forward by different interest groups on the 
causes of the crisis, its impact and the way forward towards the 
attainment of peace. 
Introduction 
The conflict in Darfur erupted on 26th February, 2003 when a joint 
force of two rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) or the Darfur Liberation Front 
(DLF) carried out some devastating attacks on Golo the headquarters 
of Jebel Marra district. The rebels succeeded in killing over 685 
policemen, destroyed over 80 police stations and wounded 500 others. 
A similar attack was waged on 25th April 2003 on a sleeping garrison 




32 were captured including the commander of the airbase. Four 
Antonov bombers and seven helicopter gun ships were also destroyed. 
The rebels on their part lost 900 soldiers. Other attacks were carried 
out in May 2003 by the SLA on a battalion at Kutum killing 500 and 
taking 300 prisoners. This was followed by another attack on Tine in 
mid July 2003 and about 250 were killed by the rebels. The rebels 
claimed that they carried all these attacks because Darfur has been 
marginalized and underdeveloped by the government of Al-Bashir 
(Flint and De Wall, 2006). The government responded to the rebel 
attacks by forming and arming the Janjaweed, an irregular 
paramilitary force consisting of its army, air force, and local defense 
forces made up of national and local volunteers and other supportive 
local language groups to fight the rebels. It did this for two reasons: 
One of these was that the government was not sure of the loyalty of its 
army which had a preponderant number coming from the region. Over 
50% of the Sudanese military were said to come from Darfur and 
secondly the government did not want to be accused of targeting some 
people for elimination. The government had, however, consistently 
denied having anything to do with the Janjaweed (BBC News, 27th 
February, 2007). By April 2004, the Janjaweed had an upper hand in 
the battle with the rebels. It succeeded in killing several thousands of 
people from the bases of the rebels mainly in Darfur and driving a 
million more from their homes. Several others, about 100,000, were 
forced to flee into neighbouring Chad pursued by the government 
militiamen. Rape was a major weapon used by the militia against 
women to humiliate them and render them unclean and ostracized 
from their societies. The war had raged on against the rebels since 
then with more killings, raping and many more being forced out of 
their homes. As late as 8th February, 2008, more than 30,000 people 
were reported to have been displaced in a government backed militia 
attack on the villages of Abu Surouj, Sirba, and Seleia in West Darfur. 
An unknown number of children aged 12-18, especially boys were 
declared missing, and several buildings were burnt all in an attempt to 
route one of the opposition groups, the Justice and Equality 
Movement from these places (Flint and De Wall, 2006,) 




Causes of the Crisis 
The crisis in Darfur had been made obscure, confusing and 
complicated as a result of the flurry of explanations that have been put 
across by different interest groups, organizations, individuals and the 
print and electronic media. So far the crisis has been interpreted in 
ethnic/religious terms, some had viewed it as being caused by 
marginalization and still others had reported it as another case of 
genocide. There were other explanations that had seen it as a long- 
running fight for political supremacy between the two factions of the 
ruling Sudanese Islamist Movement, the Popular Congress Party led 
by  Hassan Turabi and the ruling National Congress led by President 
Al-Bashir. It is important to examine each of these interpretations to 
see how far they can be taken to explain the crisis in Darfur. 
 
Ethnic/religious explanation: 
 The crisis in Darfur has been widely portrayed as an ethnic cleansing 
by the Arab militias against Black African villagers or a conflict 
between Arab and African populations. It was presented as a racial 
conflict between the light skinned ‘Arabs’ drawn mostly from the 
camel- herding nomads of Baggara ‘tribes’ of northern Rizeigat and 
the land- tilling black ‘African’ ethnic groups of Fur, Zaghawa and 
Massalit . The Knight Ridder Newspapers of 20th August, 2004 cited 
the destruction of schools in Darfur by the Arab militias as a good 
example of the attempt to wipe out the black culture. Nicholas Kristof 
(2004) was also emphatic about this racial difference when he alleged 
that the black Africans were driven from their homes by lighter- 
skinned Arabs, the Janjaweed. It is however clear that the war was not 
racial in the way it was seen as the Arabs just trying to uproot 
Africans from their homes. The crisis was much more complex than 
that. Moreover, so many other analysts such as Ateem Selsi, de Wall 
etc. had shown that there is little or no racial difference between the 
language groups; Arab or African as a result of a long period of inter 
marriage and so much mixing. The language groups were all black 
and were physically indistinguishable. Ateem Selsi (2004) particularly 
noted that the people in Sudan look alike so much so that you cannot 




tell from the features of the body that one is Arab or African. He 
acknowledged being lighter in complexion than most of the so-called 
Arabs as an African.  De Waal (2006), in the same way, challenged 
this stereotype by showing that the Darfur Arabs are black, indigenous 
African Muslims just like the non-Arabs.  He noted interalia that the 
Zaghawa are indigenous black and African sharing distant origins 
with the Berbers of Morocco and other ancient Saharan peoples. But 
that the name of the ‘Bedeyat’ the Zaghawa’s close kin ‘Bedeyin’ or 
Bedouins is a pointer to their true origin. He added that the Zaghawa’s 
adversaries in this war, the Darfurian Arabs, are Arabs in the ancient 
sense of ‘Bedouins’, meaning desert nomad and concluded that the 
Darfurian Arabs too, are indigenous, black and African and that there 
are no discernible racial or religious differences between the two: all 
have lived there for centuries.  
 
The international commission of inquiry on Darfur which was set up 
by the former Secretary General to the UN, Mr. Kofi Anan also 
observed that the various ‘tribes’ that have been the object of attacks 
and killings, chiefly the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa language groups 
do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic group 
to which persons or militias that attack them belong. The committee 
concluded that the ethnic groups speak the same language (Arabic) 
and embrace the same religion (Islam) (Report of the International 
Commission on Darfur to the UN Secretary General (PDF) UN 25th, 
January, 2006, p.129).  
The argument that the crisis was racial and ethnic was, therefore, not 
only unfounded but malicious and dangerous and obscures the reality 
of what is happening in the Darfurian region of western Sudan. 
Similarly, the portrayal of the crisis as a western plot to undermine 
Islam is another attempt to obliterate the true situation.  
A Case of Genocide? 
 Related very closely to the racial argument, was the claim that the 
Darfur crisis was another case of genocide i.e. a deliberate plan or 
intention by the government to kill or exclude a whole population 




group as was the case in the  Holocaust, the Armenians in Turkey or 
more recently in Rwanda or Kosovo and other parts of former 
Yugoslavia. Eric Reeves (2004) is one of the leading advocates of this 
argument. He was of the opinion that the government in Khartoum 
had a singular objective of eliminating the African language groups in 
Darfur out of Sudan. He alleged that a document seized from a 
Janjaweed official directed all the commanders and security officers to 
change the demography of the area and make it void of African tribes 
by killing the people, burning their villages and farms, terrorizing 
them and confiscating their property and forcing them out of the 
region. The United States of America had also declared the crisis as 
genocide based on a study that was commissioned and funded by 
sections of the American government and carried out by the New 
York based physicians for human rights. The former U.S Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell noted that genocide was committed in Darfur 
while addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
September 2004 after a visit to Sudan (Interpress Service, 2007). 
There had been several negative reactions, however, towards this 
approach to the crisis. Peter Quayle (2005) has for example shown 
that it is wrong to label the events in Darfur as genocide as people are 
attacked only because of the possibility they shelter and sustain rebels 
but outside the conflict area they were unharmed. The UN Under 
Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland was also of the 
opinion that the term ethnic cleansing or genocide did not fit the 
events in Darfur as the same ‘tribes’ are represented both among those 
who are cleansed and those who are cleansing ( PANA, 2004).  It is 
also important to note what Medicins Sans Frontiers or Medicine 
without borders have said over the conflict. They noted that there was 
no systematic target-targeting one systematic group or another one. 
Bradol (2004) said that the use of the term genocide was inappropriate 
as their teams had not seen evidence of the deliberate intention to kill 
people of a specific group or eliminate them altogether. 
 
Similarly, the UN under Kofi Annan, the AU under President 
Obasanjo of Nigeria and the EU’s fact finding mission have all denied 




that the situation in Darfur was a case of genocide even though there 
were killings and destruction of lives and property.  The attitude of the 
government towards the displaced people was another pointer to the 
fact that the conflict does not look like genocide. The government has 
been trying to return the displaced people back to their homes. By 
November 2004, they had returned 270,000 to their places of origin. 
The government has also, contrary to expectation under a typical 
genocide scenario, been allowing foreigners and especially journalists 
into the area unobstructed, to report about the situation in the region. 
A total of about 8500 aid workers including reporters of The Times, 
The Washington Post, The Telegraph, The Guardian, The Economist, 
etc. spent weeks and months in Darfur (Hoile, 2005).  
Claims of Marginalization and Underdevelopment: 
The claim by the insurgents and their apologists that the conflict was 
caused by abysmal neglect, negligence, marginalization and general 
underdevelopment of Darfur by the government of Al-Bashir has been 
repudiated by the government. The government used statistical data to 
prove that Darfur is not more underdeveloped than other parts of 
Sudan. In the field of education it demonstrated that at the time it 
came into power in 1989, there were only 16 high schools and 241 
primary schools with a total enrolment of 27,000 students and no 
single university; but by 2003 they had increased the number of the 
high schools to 251, the primary schools to 241, built 3 universities 
and the enrolment rose to 440,000. Similarly, the number of hospitals 
rose from 3 in 1988 to 23 by 2001 and from about 20 to 44 health 
centres within the same period. The government further claimed that it 
raised water supply from 1,200,000 cubic metres in 1989 to 3,100,000 
cubic metres in 2003 through the installation of 110 deep ground 
wells, the rehabilitation of 133 others, building of 30 dams, 43 dykes, 
the drilling of 842 hand pumps and the rehabilitation of 839 others. 
Power generation rose from 230 kilowatts in 1989 to 4,500 kilowatts 
by the year 2000 and provided 3 airports at al- Fasher, Nyala and al-
Geneina along with 3 aerodromes and numerous roads across the 
length and breadth of Darfur. The  government of Al-Bashir has in 




addition shown that even at the political level, there is no 
marginalization, whatsoever, on Darfur. Four state governors and 
eight government ministers are said to have come from the region 
with many more representing at the National Assembly. Others were 
members of the supreme and constitutional court of the country 
(Hoile, 2005). The perennial attacks by the armed rebels on some of 
the key educational and development projects as well as individuals 
engaged in these projects had further cast aspersions on the claim of 
marginalization.  The Chairman of North Darfur once expressed 
surprise at the way the rebels were attacking some development 
projects in the state while claiming lack of development as the cause 
of their movement (Sudan Vision, 2004). One of the most prominent 
human right activists in Sudan, Ghazi Suleiman (2004) also noted that 
the conflict has nothing to do with marginalization or the inequitable 
distribution of wealth. If all these claims by the government and 
testimonies of others were anything to go by, then the crisis was 
certainly not caused by the reason of marginalization. 
 
Power Struggle within the Ruling National Congress Party: 
There were strong indications that the conflict in Darfur was the 
outcome of power struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese 
Islamist Movement, the Popular Congress Party and the ruling 
National Congress Party. Ghazi Suleiman (2004) described the 
conflict as a struggle to seize power in Khartoum and the battle field 
was in Darfur. He apportioned the blame on Hassan Turabi and said 
that if the government would release him and come to terms with him, 
the fight would stop in a week.  Sudarsan Raghavan (2004) of the 
Knight Ridder Newspapers also interpreted the conflict as part of a 
long running fight for political supremacy between Sudanese 
president Omar al-Bashir and an ardent supporter of Osama bin Laden 
in the person of Hassan Turabi. He noted that the latter was Sudan’s 
most powerful man for 15 years and had been maneuvering political 
affairs as the speaker of the parliament until he was sidelined in 1999. 
The General Secretary of the Pan-African Movement and Co-Director 
of Justice Africa, Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem (2004) also expressed the 




same view that Darfur was a victim of the split within the National 
Islamic Front personified by Al-Turabi and his former protégé Al- 
Bashir. 
 
Others like de Wall (2006), variously commented that Al-Turabi’s 
ultimate goal was the presidential palace in Khartoum and a stridently 
Islamic Sudan and that the government of Al-Bashir was afraid of 
him. It was also believed that his supporters form the core of the rebel 
groups, an allegation that he had never denied.   The differences 
between the factions had been attributed by de Waal (2006) to be over 
ideology, foreign policy, the constitution, and ultimately power itself. 
Al-Turabi was said to be opposed to Khartoum’s association with 
America, including Sudan’s considerable assistance in the war on 
terrorism and the concessions Khartoum made in the peace process 
with southern Sudan. He was accused of having the secret agenda of 
overthrowing the government of Sudan and replacing it with a more 
hard line Islamic regime. One way of achieving this was through the 
publication and distribution of the ‘Black Book’ by his Popular 
Congress Party in May 2000, alleging Khartoum’s marginalization 
and neglect of Darfur and claiming that Sudan’s political elite was 
dominated by a northern Arab clique.  According to de Waal, the book 
was a key step in the polarization of the country along politically 
constructed racial rather than religious lines and it laid the basis for a 
coalition between Darfur’s radicals who formed the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) and its islamists who formed the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM).  The colossal lost of lives and property and the 
displacement of millions of people were as a result of the resolve by 
the government of Al-Bashir to defeat JEM and SLM at any cost. The 
government believed that Turabi was using Darfur as a tool to return 
to power in Khartoum and this has been its main reason for refusing to 
talk to the rebels particularly JEM and to defiantly refuse the 
intervention of international organizations like the UN. Hence the 
power struggle within the ranks of the Sudan’s ruling party seems to 
be the actual cause of the crisis and ultimately the major reason why 




people are being killed, maimed, raped and displaced in Darfur since 
2003. 
International Interests in the Conflict: 
The international response to the crisis in Darfur was largely 
determined by the interests of the powers in the conflict. At the initial 
stage the world’s most powerful countries chose to be complacent or 
reticent but with calls on the United Nations to take action. The UN 
on its part abandoned the responsibility to the African Union which 
then deployed a token force without a mandate to protect civilians. 
The world’s most powerful countries remained aloof, indifferent and 
sometimes even aided the combatants, leading to the escalation of the 
crisis, until recently. This attitude was attributed to series of factors. 
The first of this has to do with the attempts by the western powers to 
counter Chinese-Sudanese Oil Cooperation and to defer further oil 
deals by China in the region.  Fidelity, a subsidiary of the state- 
controlled China National Petroleum Corporation was said to own a 
major stake in Sudan’s national oil consortia and maintains extensive 
operations there. It purchased more than half of Sudan oil exports in 
2005. It is now being speculated that the profits which is up to 2 
billion dollars every year, from these sales is what is enabling the 
Khartoum government to buy weapons with which to continue its 
military operations both directly and by proxy in Darfur 
(Johannesburgh Interpress Service, 2007). China was further accused 
of providing weapons and aircrafts to Sudan in order to obtain oil and 
gas and using its veto on the UN Security Council to protect 
Khartoum from sanctions, water down or make toothless every 
resolution on Darfur in order to protect its interests in Sudan. The 
Sudanese government was said to have purchased about 100 million 
dollars in arms from China and used the weapons against the rebels in 
2007. This has been the reason behind the recent calls to boycott the 
forthcoming Olympics in China made by the French presidential 
candidate, Francois Bayrou, actor and UNICEF Goodwill 
Ambassador, Mia Farrow, Genocide Intervention Network 




Representative, Ronan Farrow as well as the Sudan scholar and 
author, Eric Reeves (Sudan Tribune, 11th February, 2007).  
Secondly, there was the issue of the involvement of al-Qaeda with the 
rebel groups like the JEM and Al-Turabi. Al-Qaeda has been noted to 
be interested in Darfur on account of its physical inaccessibility, its 
Islamic heritage, inaccessibility to western intelligence services and its 
porous borders, making it a very attractive location to hide in and 
wage an attack. Turabi is said to be very close to Osama bin Laden 
and shared his vision of a worldwide struggle to establish a pure 
caliphate. The members of JEM have also received some of their 
training with al-Qaeda instructors including specialists in guerilla and 
urban warfare and logistics in the 1990’s. JEM is also suspected of 
having links with several other militant Islamist groups in Africa and 
around the world (Hoile, 2004). The US and other countries of 
Western Europe were, therefore, hesitant to act from the beginning 
because they wanted to see al- Qaeda routed out of the area. 
 Thirdly, there were also reports about American involvement in 
sustaining the insurgency. Eric Morgolis (2004) noted that the 
American CIA was supplying arms and money to the rebels in Darfur 
and was using the rebels as it did in Southern Sudan’s thirty year old 
insurgency to destabilize the Khartoum regime whose policies were 
deemed insufficiently pro-American and too Islamic. It is further said 
to be eyeing Sudan’s oil as well as other precious commodities like 
water.  On the other hand, America is said to be reluctant to act in the 
conflict because of what John Prentergast called the clash between 
human rights principles with post 9/11 counter terrorism operatives. 
He attributed the reluctance on the part of the United States of 
America to act to the influence of Osama bin Laden in Darfur. 
America is now said to be using bin Laden’s former ally,  Salah 
Abdallah Gosh as an active counterterrorism partner, detaining 
terrorism suspects and turning them over to the US, expelling Islamic 
extremists and raiding suspected terrorists homes and handing 
evidence to the FBI. Gosh is currently the head of security of the 
government and playing a leading role in the counter insurgency 




strategy which relies on the Janjaweed militias to destroy the villages 
in Darfur that have linkages with bin-Laden. Prentergast argues that it 
is this deepening intelligence sharing relationship between 
Washington and Khartoum that blunted any US response to the state 
sponsored violence that exploded in 2003 and 2004. America felt that 
access to Gosh’s information would be jeopardized if the Bush 
administration confronted Khartoum on Darfur. The US has also been 
said to be pursuing a peace deal between Southern Sudanese rebels 
and the regime in Khartoum since 2001 and didn’t want to undermine 
that process by hammering Khartoum over Darfur (Africa Focus, 
2006). It is worth noting that Bush administration deliberately refused 
to act on what Bush himself repeatedly called genocide nearly five 
years into the crisis. On 29th May, 2007, however, President Bush, 
apparently, reacting to home pressure and international condemnation 
of the conflict and American indifference to it, pronounced sanctions 
which made it a crime for US companies and individuals to knowingly 
do business with 31 companies from the American financial system 
(The White House, 2007). The sanction was of course, welcomed but 
it was said to be long overdue and of no consequence since China and 
Russia still sell arms to Khartoum which technically are not for use in 
the western war. Similarly, many see it as a contradiction, paradox 
and mere pretence for the US to impose sanctions on a country that it 
considers being of vital importance in regional security and which it 
needs its support in the long war against al-Qaeda.   
As mentioned earlier, Sudan is reported to be providing intelligence 
reports to the west, especially on al-Qaeda’s penetration of North 
Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as indicated in the recent Islamic 
terrorist attacks in Algeria, Morocco and northern Nigeria and its 
operations in Iraq as well as the Islamic resurgence in Somalia 
following the invasion by Ethiopia. Lastly some segments of the Arab 
media have criticized the publicity that is being given to the crisis as 
being exaggerative and diversionary with the intention of covering the 
crimes being committed by the Israelites in Palestine and Iraq. They 




have claimed that “the western attention to the Darfur crisis is a cover 
for what is really being planned and carried out by the western forces 
of hegemony and control in our Arab world (Al- Hayat ( English 
edition) 13th April, 2007). Eritrea was also alleged to be rendering 
support to the rebels militarily, logistically, and politically. Among 
other things, it has been said to have provided the avenue for the 
signing of an agreement between the Darfur gunmen and elements of 
the Beja Congress, armed anti- government group based in Eritrea as 
well as hosting Darfur rebel organizations. The government of Sudan 
was said to have lodged a formal complaint to the UN and AU about 
this attempt by Eritrea to destabilize it (Asmara 14th July, 2007 and 
Deutche Press Agentur, 5th January, 2004).  
The Impact of Darfur Conflict:  
The conflict in Darfur has led to enormous lost of lives and property 
and the displacement of people. It is significant to note that there has 
so far been no concensus as regards to the number of people that had 
perished as a result of the conflict. The estimated number has ranged 
from 50,000 given by World Health Organisation (WHO) in 
September, 2004 to 500,000 as given by Eric Reeves in February, 
2007 and 400,000 as given by the Coalition for International Justice 
and been cited by the UN .The latest research published in September, 
2006 in the journal ‘Science’ has put the number of deaths above 
200,000 without distinction made between those who died as a result 
of violence and those dying as a result of starvation or disease in 
refugee camps (BBC News 27th February, 2007). The government has 
maintained that only 9000 people have been killed. By 2004 the 
number of displaced people had been put at 2.5 million with more 
than 230,000 in eastern Chad and about 515,000 in other neighboring 
countries, mainly the centralAfrican Republic, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda with fewer numbers in 
Libya and Egypt. To date the UN office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that there are over 
250,000 Sudanese refugees and over 180,000 internally displaced 




persons in eastern Chad who are heavily reliant on humanitarian aid 
for their survival (UN News Service,  2007). 
The conflict also destabilized some neighbouring countries especially 
along the Chad- Sudan border and the whole region. A strained 
relationship between Chad and Sudan is evident as the two countries 
accused each other of supporting destabilizing forces. Sudan accused 
Chad of backing Darfur’s National Redemption Front rebels who have 
been carrying out cross- border raids. There are also allegations that 
many of these rebels have been assimilated into Chad’s national army, 
having come from the same ethnic group with Chad’s President Idriss 
Derby, a charge the Chad government denied. Chad, on the other 
hand, accused Sudan government backed militia, the Janjaweed, of 
attacking villagers in Chad and some of the more than 200,000 
refugees that came to eastern Chad after fleeing violence in Darfur. As 
late as March, 2007, Janjaweed forces were said to have crossed into 
Chad and killed up to 400 people. Chad, further, has consistently 
accused Khartoum of backing the Union of Forces for Democracy and 
Development (UFDD) which is a coalition of small armed groups and 
army deserters who have been launching cross border attacks on Chad 
from Darfur since 2005. Such attacks have been said to be responsible 
for the violence which has forced 180,000 Chadians to flee their 
homes. Similarly, the Central African Republic (CAR) has accused 
Sudan of backing the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) 
rebels who seized some towns in north-eastern Central African 
Republic. The government alleged that the UFDR were operating 
from Darfur with the support of the Sudanese authorities. In fact, there 
were plans by the government of Chad to send troops to Central 
African Republic to help the government fight these rebels attacking 
its northern part. Chad also accused Sudan of attempting to destabilize 
both Chad and Central African Republic and suggested an anti- Sudan 
alliance (BBC News, 6th December, 2006). 
It is also obvious that the conflict seriously affected the overall social 
and economic development of the country. This is because the 
resources that should have been used in providing good drinking 




water to the people, electricity supply, education, accessible roads and 
others have been diverted to fighting the war. General Martin L. 
Agwai (2007), the new chairman of the Joint African Union/ UN 
Hybrid operation in Darfur, recently mentioned these issues as some 
of the major obstacles to the combined UN/AU forces assignment in 
Darfur. He noted that lack of roads and communication generally and 
some basic amenities like portable drinking water are already 
impediments toward restoring peace. 
Towards finding a lasting Peace in Darfur 
The conventional approach to solving conflicts and crisis situations in 
war- torn areas has always been by drafting a peace keeping force into 
an area and providing aid to victims and sometimes imposing 
sanctions. As a short term measure this approach works but in the long 
run it does not. This can be seen in the case of other places like 
Somalia and other strife- torn countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan etc. 
This measure has also not worked in the case of Darfur. The 
deployment of some 7000 peacekeepers in 2004 by the African Union 
with the mandate to observe the ‘Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006’ 
and the more than 9000 uniformed personnel on the ground now 
including 7000 troops and 1200 police serving with the AMIS as well 
as the UNAMID hybrid force, have not been able to bring the fighting 
to an end. The murder, rape and pillage have continued unabated and 
the AU officials are not spared either. Since the deployment of AU 
troops in 2004 about 15 of them have been killed, supposedly, by the 
rebel gangs (The Guardian Newspapers, 2nd April, 2007).  This 
failure on the part of AU has rightly been attributed to lack of enough 
troops and equipment. The plans to boost the security situation in 
Darfur by drafting a hybrid UN/AU force of 19,555 troops under the 
first plan and another 17,605 with a police component of 3,772 
officers, 18 utility helicopters and about 12-18 combat helicopters; 
under the assumption that these forces can bring to an end the crisis in 
the region, is a delusion. The editorial of the Gambian Newspapers, 
(The Daily Observer, 9th July, 2007) was optimistic that peace would 
come to Sudan as soon as a larger and better- equipped force 




operating under the UN and AU was deployed to Darfur, but this is far 
from the truth. The best any peacekeeping force can do is to restore 
the security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian 
assistance and protect civilian populations that are under imminent 
threat of attacks but it cannot provide a lasting peace. Paul Moorcraft 
(2007) correctly pointed out that peacekeepers cannot keep a peace 
that does not exist and even if all US troops in Iraq were suddenly 
transplanted to Darfur, they would not be able to police a region or 
keep the peace. He has also faulted the timing of the sanctions 
imposed on a region that is trying to rebuild itself and develop its 
economy after 50 years of war. 
 
Hence what is required in the case of the Darfur crisis was a political 
solution to a political problem. As the governor of north Darfur 
pointed out, “there could be no winning in this war”, so there is the 
need to engage in a very genuine and more sincere dialogue between 
all the factions fighting in the area. The previous attempts at 
reconciling the different fighting factions were not successful, largely 
because some of the groups are still aggrieved. It is to be noted that 
not all the rebel groups signed on to the pact in Abuja, Nigeria in 
2006. In fact only one of the three rebel groups signed the agreement 
leaving the conflict unresolved. Similarly, the meeting in Libya of 
15th -16th July, 2007, to discuss the road map for peace in Sudan ran 
into problem before it even started with the SLM headed by the Paris- 
based Abdulwahid Mohammed (2007) declaring that they won’t 
recognize the outcome of the Tripoli meeting. It is significant to note 
that, Omar al-Bashir has for long resisted UN peacekeepers to enter 
Darfur because of his fear that Sudan would be turned into another 
Iraq and on one occasion said that the key to ending the conflict  
rested with the Sudanese. He told the parliament that the solution to 
the crisis must be a national responsibility with the sons and daughters 
of Sudan.  This is quite true. The crisis in Darfur is an internal 
problem and needs an internal solution. There should be internal 
machinery that could trigger dialogue with all the nine rebel 
movements which have grown and splintered into factions since 2003. 




The peace talks at the Libyan town of Sirte of 29th October, 2007 
under the auspices of the UN and the AU was a good starting point 
but more should be done to bringing the key rebel groups of JEM and 
SLA/M to the negotiating table. It is to be noted that only 7 armed 
groups turned up at Sirte out of 16 (Guest Column 5th December, 
2007). It is also important to include the representatives of civil 
society groups, the grassroots level in the form of leaders from 
different ethnic groups, the women, the displaced persons and the 
refugees. Neighbouring countries that receive thousands of these 
refugees and have influence over various rebel movements and the 
National Congress Party could also be included in such mediation 
attempts so that peace could return to the whole region. It was equally 
suggested that full participation at this mediation could be achieved by 
either convening a Darfur- wide forum with representatives of all 
constituencies or by expanding the consultations conducted earlier in 
2007 through the existing moribund Darfur Dialogue and Consultation 
Process.  
Conclusion: 
The conflict in Darfur is certainly the shame of Africa. Contrary to the 
views expressed, however, of reducing the conflict to being caused by 
tribalism or ethnic sentiments, marginalization or genocide, we have 
shown that the crisis was rooted within the internal political dynamics 
of the Sudanese society.  This paper has been able to establish the 
impact of the crisis on Sudan, the entire region and the continent as a 
whole. It is another example of the kind of senselessness, greed and 
avarice that is typical of the African ruling elite; the extent to which 
they can go to perpetuate and sustain themselves in power no matter 
the cost in human life and suffering. The combatants in Darfur have 
clearly demonstrated their insensitivity to the summary executions, 
sexual violence, and acts of torture, pillaging and displacements of 
unimaginable magnitude that have taken place over the last five years. 
The crisis can only be resolved through sincere and honest discussion 
among all the factions and other interest groups and not by the 
presence of some peacekeeping forces. Peace can only come from 
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